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OIL SHALE-A NEW SET OF UNCERTAINTIES
JOHN J. SCHANZ, JR.* and HARRY PERRY**

INTRODUCTION

A British Petroleum pipeline finds its way across the sea floor
from the Forties Field, comes ashore alongside a venerable Scottish
golf course, and proceeds southward, broaching ancient Roman walls
enroute. At the terminus, within sight of the Firth of Forth, the
North Sea oil is held awaiting further shipment by tanker. The tanks
are cleverly hidden from casual view by the rolling green terrain. The
spoil banks of a bygone Scottish oil shale era now provide a pleasant
camouflage for the resource industry that replaced it.
Mining and retorting of oil shale has been practiced for over 100
years in many different countries. However, with the discovery of
petroleum reserves the industry declined rapidly in size, and shale oil
was used in decreasing amounts. Ever since this development, the
intriguing question has been whether shale oil can once again become
a major source of liquid hydrocarbons.
One of the periodic revivals in oil shale enthusiasm appeared in the
mid-1960's, but by 1969 this enthusiasm had begun to wane. The Oil
Shale Corporation's (TOSCO) estimates of operating costs at $1.55
per barrel appeared bullish, but the Cabinet Task Force on Oil Import Policy was considering removal of oil import quotas and world
oil was in abundant supply and selling at under $2.00 per barrel.'
Perhaps most discouraging were the difficulties being encountered by
the Sun Oil Company at its Great Canadian Oil Sands venture in
Alberta.2 Reports of Sun's continuing losses triggered caution in the
board rooms of firms holding oil shale lands.
Ten more years have now passed, and imported oil now arrives at
$14.49 per barrel, and new domestic crude brings an upper-tier price
of $12.29.' Surely shale oil, which was nearly economic at $4.00 to
$5.00 per barrel, must now be ready to burst upon the energy scene.
Or is it?
*Fellow, Resources for the Future.
**Consultarit, Resources for the Future.

1. Schanz, The Outlook for Synthetic Liquid Hydrocarbons, 65 Q. Colo. Sch. Mines 13
(Oct. 1970).
2. New York Times, May 12, 1969, at 69.
3. CHASE MANHATTAN BANK, 2 The Petroleum Situation 4 (Table 1) (April 1978).
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BOOM AND BUST IN THE SEVENTIES
Among the nation's major oil firms, not all are equally fortunate
in having access to crude oil to meet their refinery needs. Thus firms
such as Ashland Oil, Atlantic Richfield, or Standard Oil of Ohio have
always been on the alert for any turn of events that could improve
the outlook for new feedstock sources. Then embargo of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the subsequent drastic change in world oil prices was certain to stimulate these
firms and others to reexamine their position with regard to oil shale.
Atlantic Richfield had already joined the Colony consortium and was
engaged in a rigorous technical and economic inquiry into the feasibility of building a plant on private lands.4 There was revived interest
in public land leasing, and it appeared unlikely that there would be a
repeat performance of the pitifully small bids that were rejected by
Interior in 1968.
Things began to move forward smoothly, with Colony announcing
that the first commercial-sized plant would be built at their Parachute Creek site.' The bids made for the first two federal tracts in
early 1974 surprised the Department of the Interior once again, this
time because they were on the high side. Standard Oil Company of
Indiana and Gulf Oil Corporation bid $210.3 million for tract C-a in
Colorado. Atlantic Richfield, TOSCO, Ashland Oil Company and
Shell Oil bid $117.8 million for tract C-b. 6 It appeared that for the
first time in the over fifty-year history of the Mineral Leasing Act,
there would also be a commercial-sized operation on the public
lands. But misfortune does not give up easily on its treatment of oil
shale.
Environmental concerns continued to harass and delay the ventures. It was determined that the background levels of certain types
of air pollutants exceeded federal clean air standards. There remained
uncertainty about the ability to revegetate the surface after mining
and the ability to deal properly with the wastes from the retorts.
Questions about the adequacy of water supplies and the potential for
harming aquifers or causing deterioration in regional water quality
could not be answered to everyone's satisfaction.
Problems also appeared with respect to mining itself. The 5,000
acre tracts were not adequate in size for both surface mining and for
the disposal of waste rock. Underground mining at the C-b lease, on
the other hand, was encountering difficulties related to the strength
4. 68 Oil & Gas J. 34, 42 (1970).
5. 184 Science 4143, 1271 (1974).
6. Wall Street Journal, February 13, 1974, at 4.

October 1978]

OIL SHALE-A NEW SET OF UNCERTAINTIES

or competence of the rock to protect the workings. But most alarming was the rapid escalation in the estimates of the capital costs to
construct the plants.
While it appeared that higher priced world oil, which was due to
OPEC decisions plus the increasing cost of domestic drilling offered
an unparalleled opportunity for shale oil development, the financial
environment for the capital-intensive shale oil industry was deteriorating rapidly (See Table 1). Although estimates vary among companies and between government and private analyses, there is general
agreement about the approximate level of oil shale plant capital
costs, operating costs, and the required price, assuming an equivalent
rate of return. An examination of the statistical data from a variety
of sources shown in Table 1 reveals that, from 1968 to 1973, the
capital requirements for a 50,000 barrel per day plant doubled. The
estimates then more than tripled between 1973 and 1976. Today on
paper the cost of an oil shale plant of a size and degree of processing
comparable to those proposed ten years ago has likely passed the $1
billion mark.
Operating costs, given prevailing inflationary conditions, have been
somewhat better behaved than capital costs. These costs doubled
between 1968 and 1976. This is in reasonable accord with the behavior of the wholesale price index for industrial commodities. Given
the 277 percent increase in the value of U.S. crude oil and the 722
percent increase in the posted price of Saudi Arabian oil during this
period, the oil shale industry could have improved its relative competitive position if capital costs had stayed in line with other inflationary trends. Unfortunately, the 696 percent increase in the estimated cost of building the shale oil plants totally negated this
advantage. By 1976 the required price for shale oil, even at a modest
12 to 13 percent discounted cash flow rate of return, had reached
$18 or more a barrel.'7 This was well over the market price of either
domestic or foreign oil. So, by 1976, shale oil's competitive picture
was perhaps worse than it had been in 1968.
It was already apparent by the end of 1974 that the oil shale
bubble had burst once again. In rapid succession, the companies
retrenched. By October 1974, Colony announced that it was suspending its plans at Parachute Creek.' On the federal leases development was initially delayed, then companies began to withdraw from
the ventures. Activity on the leases was replaced by appeals for government assistance of one form or another for shale oil production to
be feasible.
7. 198 Science 4321, 1023 (1977).
8. J. Comm., November 19, 1974, at 3.
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It was apparent to the companies involved that environmental
standards were stricter than ever before, that state and local taxes
would likely increase, and that the affected communities were very
concerned over uncertain socioeconomic impacts rather than being
impressed by new employment opportunities. Nonetheless, these
problems were probably manageable. The capital costs were the root
difficulty. One might be inclined to suspect the calculations themselves, but a comparable quadrupling of capital costs is also found in
the estimates made by other firms involved in western coal gasification projects.9
There appears to have been a number of circumstances encountered between 1973 and 1976 that caused a multiplicative effect in
the cost estimates. Initially, there was the general double digit inflationary trend. To this was added a somewhat faster increase in cost
for constructing refineries or similar type plants. These costs were
increasing as much as 40 percent per year by 1976.' 0 Coupled with
these inflationary trends was the fact that oil shale mines and plants
had become more expensive in real terms as they were redesigned to
meet new and more stringent environmental requirements. The direct
and indirect costs of public investments in the communities supporting the plants became apparent and they also had to be factored into
the estimates. In many early estimates the cost of the leases had not
been included. Procedural and legal matters added two to three years
to the time required between the beginning of a project and the time
when production could be anticipated. A twenty-four month delay
in production commencement is sufficient by itself to require as
much as a 20 percent increase in the price required for a plant to be
economically feasible. Finally, analysts were making a future inflationary adjustment for all anticipated capital and operating costs. In
retrospect, given the above series of events the ratchet effect of these
accumulative adjustments is not surprising.
A SHIFT IN TECHNOLOGY
Short of major governmental intervention, it has become apparent
that no firm is currently prepared to risk its funds in conventional oil
shale mining and surface retorting. Consequently, the search has
turned to finding a process that will: reduce total capital costs, permit the project to be built and operated in a series of stages, and
9. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, STATUS AND OBSTACLES TO COMMERCIALIZATION OF COAL LIQUEFACTION AND GASIFICATION, Report to U.S. Senate
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 27 (1976).
10. Nelson Cost Indexes, 76 Oil and Gas Journal 18, 55 (May 1978).
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offer a better way to deal with the group of problems involving air
and water quality, surface disturbance, and waste disposal.
Since the 1950's a number of surface retorting methods have been
developed in the United States, and their technical feasibility has
been proven so that there is acceptable technical risk for industry to
proceed to commercial scale development. Although there have been
some new processes and some refinements in old methods in the last
ten years, none have been developed and tested to a point where it
has been proven that they would significantly reduce the cost of the
plants or the shale oil produced. Some of the more recent designs
appear to offer some improvements in surface-type operations and
they may actually reduce water consumption and minimize adverse
environmental effects. Unfortunately, such processes and plant designs that minimize water requirements and environmental impact
tend to be higher in cost than those that do not.
As a result, there has been a recent shift in near-term oil shale
development. True in situ retorting (no mining is used) has received
sporadic research and development (R&D) efforts by several private
companies since the early 1950's. The major difficulty encountered
was the inability to create sufficient permeability in the oil shale
formation to permit retorting at economic rates. For true in situ
mining to become economically attractive, methods must be devised
to fracture the shale economically and create enough permeability to
permit good contact between the shale and the retorting gases, and
to prevent bypassing of unretorted shale so that high recovery of oil
is possible.
In true in situ mining, wells are driven from the surface into the
shale formation and the shale is then rubblized. The fractured shale is
then ignited at a central production well into which air is blown, and
combustion takes place underground. The products oil, water, and
gas are recovered from a series of production wells driven around the
injection well at 35 to 50-foot intervals.
The permeability needed to attain air flow at a reasonable pressure
and in the necessary volumes into the oil shale can be attained by
hydraulic fracturing, chemical explosive fracturing or a combination
of both. In hydraulic fracturing, water or a water base gel containing
sand is injected under high pressure into the oil shale. The water
pressure fractures the shale and the sand remains in the formation to
hold the fracture open in order to remove the oil. In chemical explosive fracturing one of several types of explosives are injected into the
borehole and detonated.
Hydraulic fracturing tests have been made at two sites using Wyoming shale, and explosive fracturing experiments have been con-
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ducted at three Wyoming sites. On the basis of these experiences it
has been concluded that hydraulic fracturing followed by explosive
rubblization is relatively difficult to carry out and the bed porosity
created is very low. Production efficiencies are expected to be low,
and in the tests actually conducted recovery efficiency was less than
5 percent. 1 ' The explosive fracturing (using a technique known as
"well bore springing") is a much simpler system but the dimensions
of the retort that is created are limited in total volume, and it is
difficult to get sufficient permeability in the shale to sustain combustion. As a result, one can only conclude that at present, true in situ
technology is not yet technically proven.
To overcome the difficulties mentioned above and to try to take
advantage of the potential benefits of the in situ approach, modified
in situ tests have been conducted. Several different methods are
being tested. In 1972, Occidental Oil Shale Corporation began a
study of its modified in situ process.' 2 Since then three research
retorts and two commercial-sized retorts have been prepared and
combustion tests on them have been conducted.
In modified in situ processing a small part of the oil shale is mined
and the balance to be retorted is then fractured and rubblized in the
space created by mining, and a permeable zone for retorting is
formed. In the Occidental Oil Shale Corporation process approximately 15 percent of the oil shale is mined from the upper and
lower levels of the planned retort. After fracturing of the shale between the mined-out areas with explosives that create a rubblized
pile, vertical holes are drilled into the fractured chambers. The
broken shale is ignited at the top and air is injected downward to
maintain combustion. Oil and gas are recovered from the bottom of
the retort and part of the gas is recirculated to control the oxygen
concentration in the inlet combustion gas.
The Lawrence Livermore Laboratory is also investigating a modified in situ retorting process called Rubble In Situ Extraction (RISE)
that is a variation of the Occidental process. The essential difference
is in the method of stoping. Where, prior to blasting, the Occidental
procedure mines a room above and below the planned retort, the
RISE method mines drifts driven the width of the block at multiple
levels. Development, fan drilling, and loading after blasting proceed
1
on subsequent sublevels. 3
In addition to the government-sponsored RISE project, the De11.
22, 12
12.
13.

Burwell, Sterner & Carpenter, Shale Oil Recovery by In Situ Retorting, a Pilot Study,
J. Petroleum Tech. 1520 (Dec. 1970).
71 Oil & Gas J. 39, 94 (1973).
A. LEWIS & A. ROTHMAN, Rubble In-Situ Extraction (1975).
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partment of Energy (DOE) is supporting additional modified in situ
projects with Equity Oil Company (modified in situ shale oil solution
mining), with Geokinetics, Inc. (horizontal modified in situ), at the
Laramie Energy Research Laboratory (horizontal modified in situ),
and DOE is providing support for the Occidental process described
above." 4 Another government-sponsored project that is designed to
develop long-term shale deposits aimed at the production of gas from
shale is being conducted by the Dow Chemical Company.
WHITHER NOW?
There has now appeared some optimism, although not universally
shared, that modified in situ mining offers a way of getting an oil
shale industry under way. Major attention will be focused on two
Colorado federal leases. Occidental Petroleum and Ashland Oil Company will be partners using Occidental's modified in situ method at
the C-b tract. Concurrently, Gulf Oil and Standard Oil of Indiana
have also shifted their Rio Blanco Oil Shale Project on the C-a lease
to the RISE modified in situ method (see Table 2). The Rio Blanco
project, employing a different approach to preparation of the retorting chamber, is not as well advanced experimentally as Occidental's
and will require further small scale investigation before commercialsized development can be considered.' s
Numerous advantages are now claimed for modified in situ. Operations will be developed in a series of steps. The projects will require
only about one third as many people as the surface plants, minimizing the local socioeconomic adjustments to the new ventures.
Water requirements will be reduced to 25 to 33 percent of normal
requirements. 16 Spent shale disposal will be sharply reduced by 80
percent.
Government encouragement of commercial oil shale development
is now becoming apparent. Colorado's Air Pollution Commission has
eased its sulfur emission standards to a level that will make operations feasible. The Environmental Protection Agency has also given
its approval for the projects to proceed. Tax credits have been proposed and there will be participation in the "entitlements" program
for refinery purchases. Entitlement is a cost allocation program designed to equalize refiners' disparate oil costs from different sources.
14. 75 Oil & Gas J. 42, 65 (1977).
15. Personal communication with Dr. ARTHUR LEWIS, Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, Livermore, California.
16. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, ENERGY FROM OIL SHALE, Report
to Subcommittee on Energy of the House Committee on Science and Technology, at 18
(Nov. 1973).
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Further government assistance has been received through the Department of Energy's investments in research on rubblizing techniques
and various development projects. The Navy is also becoming involved in sponsoring tests of large scale refining of shale oil.' '
Occidental has revealed little about the proprietary details of its
process, and production costs have been estimated from various
sources at anywhere from $8 to $16 per barrel at a 15 percent rate of
return on investment. It is currently believed by those developing the
technique that the capital costs per barrel of capacity will be significantly less than for surface retorting, but annual operating expenses
may be slightly more. There are some questions about how much
upgrading of the shale oil is included in these costs, and whether or
not the oil can be refined by conventional methods without further
processing.
Only the vertical modified in situ process of Occidental has been
tested on a scale large enough to assume that it is ready to be demonstrated on a commercial scale. But even the Occidental process is at
too early a stage of development to be certain that it will be commercially viable. It is quite apparent that greater technical certainty has
been traded for a method of minimizing water needs, environmental
problems, and socioeconomic impacts. Thus compared to aboveground retorting which has a much larger R&D history, estimates of
technical and economic feasibility are markedly less certain. The
estimated costs of producing oil by in situ methods may seem lower
than production by surface methods, but the accuracy of the estimates must be considered questionable at this point.
It must also be remembered that the modified in situ approach is
not totally free of environmental problems. The impact of a large
number of retorting chimneys on water quality and on the alteration
of flow through subsurface aquifers is not known. The potential
impact of subsidence is another problem. Since some mining has to
take place, the eventual disposal or processing of this material must
be considered. For the moment, it appears that surface storage is
contemplated, but this can only be a temporary answer. Finally, air
pollutants are emitted into the atmosphere by in situ combustion.
Eventually, if a number of projects gets underway, the question of
air quality degradation will have to be faced again.
At the moment, surface retorting will receive additional R&D effort but the modified vertical in situ projects on federal leases still
seem to be the "best show in town" (see table 2). However, in
addition to being relatively untested, these latter methods are only
17. Science, supra note 7, at 1026.
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usable at certain depths and thicknesses of shale. There has been
some reduction in the "front-end" capital burden, but that burden
remains sizeable. One must suspect that if tracts C-a and C-b are
actually to arrive at production levels of 50,000-plus barrels per day,
there is a need for clear-cut federal energy policies and positive financial support. So long as we have no commercially demonstrated technology, the future behavior of domestic and foreign crude oil prices
is uncertain, and recalling the past undisciplined and unpredictable
policy behavior of both the state and federal governments, it is unlikely that a totally private prototype venture in the $500 million to
$1 billion price range will occur.
It will take two or three years before we can begin to assess the
current oil shale development strategy. The kind of detailed technical, environmental, and economic information that is required to
make a full appraisal apparently will not be in hand until 1983. Thus,
as in the past, shale oil production continues to be a game of watchful waiting.

